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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
LEASE
Alvin B. Rubin*
Duties of the Lessee
The plaintiff in Rials v. Davis' leased his cleaning business,
known as the Barrel Dry Cleaners, to defendant for fifty-two
weeks at $100.00 a week. Defendant also owned a competitive
cleaning business, known as Milady Cleaners. After a few weeks,
the cleaning work brought in to Barrel Dry Cleaners was trans-
ferred by defendant to Milady Cleaners. The personnel of Barrel
Dry Cleaners was reduced until only one woman was left on
duty at the premises to receive clothing from customers and,
after they had been cleaned at the other establishment, to deliver
them. Gross receipts at the Barrel Shop decreased from an aver-
age of $195.00 a week to about $40.00 a week. Plaintiff sued for,
damages occasioned by the failure of the lessee to maintain the
business as a prudent administrator. Defendant denied any
obligation on his part to continue the leased premises as a going
business.
The court correctly rejected common law authorities on the
point and considered the basic nature of the contract of lease
at civil law. Citing several of the French commentators in an
analysis of the problem, the court concluded that "The thing
leased was the business and the equipment necessary for its
operation. There is no question that the parties contemplated
the continuation of the business as a going concern during the
term of lease. A mere reading of the lease itself and the provi-
sions above referred to discloses this fact."'2
Therefore, the lessee violated his obligations by diverting
clientele of the business to another business owned by him.
Acceptance of the weekly rent thereafter did not estop the les-
sor, and an award of $3,000.00 damages by the district court was
affirmed.
Rank of Lessor's Privilege
A problem of ranking several lessor's privileges in relation
to a chattel mortgage was raised in Easterling v. Brooks.3 Brooks,
the lessee, executed a lease of a farm, and, at the time when he
*Part-time Assistant Professor of Law, Louisiana State University;
member, Baton Rouge Bar.
1. 212 La. 161, 31 So. (2d) 726 (1947).
2. 212 La. 161, 170, 31 So. (2d) 726, 729.
3. 213 La. 519, 35 So. (2d) 132 (1948).
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was not in arrears on his rent, moved a truck onto the leased
premises. Thereafter the lessee executed a chattel mortgage of
the truck to Walling, the intervenor. At a later date, Brooks, as
lessee, executed a second lease to the same lessor for a dwelling
on the farm property. Thereafter the first lease expired, Brooks
being in arrears on his rental on both leases. A third lease was
executed, this time on the farm covered by Lease Number 1.
The lessor provisionally seized the truck, along with other
property. Walling intervened, praying separate appraisal and
sale of the truck, and claiming to prime the lessor's lien. The
court of appeal affirmed the lower court in holding that all of
the lessor's claim primed the intervenor's "since Mrs. Easterling
[the lessor] acquired a fixed and vested right against the truck
when it became subject to and affected by her lessor's lien and
privilege under the first lease 'to secure payment.., of all of the
indebtedness due her' she not being required, under the law, 'to
impute payment in such a way ... as to impair her rights. .. , 4
The supreme court held that this was incorrect insofar as it
permitted the lessor's privilege arising from the second and third
leases to prime the chattel mortgage. The privilege arising from
the first lease primed the chattel mortgage even though no rent
was actually due when the chattel mortgage was executed; 5 but
the chattel mortgage primed all claims under leases arising sub-
sequent to it.6
This result was reached in reliance on "the duty of th6 credi-
tor to impute the proceeds derived from the sale of the movables
to the debt that was secured, but if of equal rank and dignity,
then to the one longest due."'7 The same result could, of course, be
reached in reliance on the express provisions of the chattel mort-
gage act.8 On either basis, the ranking made by the supreme
court appears entirely consonant with the theory of the chattel
mortgage act in its relation to lessor's privileges.
Eviction
In Lama v. Manale,9 the court held that to enable a lessor
to obtain possession of leased premises on termination of a writ-
4. 35 So. (2d) 132, 134.
5. 35 So. (2d) 132, 134.
6. Youree v. Limerick, 157 La. 39, 101 So. 864 (1924). See also Comegys
v. Shreveport Kandy Kitchen, 3 La. App. 692 (1926); Weaks Supply Co., Ltd.
v. Werdin, 147 So. 838 (La. App. 1933).
7. 35 So. (2d) 132, 135.
8. La. Act 172 of 1944, §4 [Dart's Stats. (Supp. 1947) §5022.4). -
9. 212 La. 1007, 34 So. (2d) 55 (1948).
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ten lease, only five days' notice to vacate is necessary, in order
to maintain summary ejectment proceedings. The court applied
the first paragraph of Revised Statutes Section 2155 as amended'0
and said that the ten and thirty day notice provisions of the
second paragraph of that section are inapplicable.
The comments on this statute had generally taken a con-
trary view," but there was no judicial authority on the subject.
Lower courts and practicing attorneys should welcome the defini-
tive ruling on this problem.
IV. TORTS AND WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
Wex S. Malone*
TORTS
Tort Liability of the State
The state's immunity from tort liability is limited only by
the requirement of our constitution that "private property shall
not be taken or damaged except for public purposes and after
just and adequate compensation is paid."' Somewhat similar
provisions appear in most of the state constitutions. However,
the prohibition is generally directed only at the taking of prop-
erty and is limited to appropriational harms.
The provision in the Louisiana constitution that compensa-
tion must likewise be paid for damage to private property opens
the way for an expansion of state liability which may result in
trimming down the traditional immunity of the sovereign. A
substantial body of law had been developed in Louisiana which
perhaps pointed in this direction. Damages for injury inadver-
tently inflicted during the course of public improvement work
had been recovered in several decisions: 2 In all these cases, how-
ever, the injury followed from affirmative conduct of the state's
agents in making public improvements on land, and usually the
damage merely represented extended compensation for an in-
10. See La. Act 200 of 1936 [Dart's Stats. (1939) §§6597-66011.
11. Compare Comment (1940) 2 LOUISIANA LAW REvIEw 161, and Comment
(1946) 21 Tulane L. Rev. 256.
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1. La. Const. of 1921, Art. I, § 2.
2. Green v. Board of Com'rs of Lake Borgne Basin Levee Dist., 163 La.
117, 111 So. 619 (1927); De Moss v. Police Jury of Bossier Parish, 167 La. 83,
118 So. 700 (1928); Nagle v. Police Jury of Caddo Parish, 175 La. 704, 144 So.
425 (1932).
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